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ABSTRACT
We provide an axiomatic model of preferences over atemporal risks that generalizes Gul’s
disappointment aversion model by allowing risk aversion to be “first order” at locations in the state
space that do not correspond to certainty. Since the lotteries being valued by an agent in an asset-
pricing context are not typically local to certainty, our generalization, when embedded in a dynamic
recursive utility model, has important quantitative implications for financial markets. We show that
the state-price process, or asset-pricing kernel, in a Lucas-tree economy in which the representative
agent has generalized disappointment aversion preferences is consistent with the pricing kernel that
resolves the equity-premium puzzle. We also demonstrate that a small amount of conditional
heteroskedasticity in the endowment-growth process is necessary to generate these favorable results.
In addition, we show that risk aversion in our model can be both state-dependent and counter-
cyclical, which empirical research has demonstrated is necessary for explaining observed asset-
pricing behavior.
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The observed facts of aggregate risks and asset prices in the post-war US econ-
omy have led researchers to explore models of intertemporal preferences that
generalize the well-developed time-additive-expected-utility speciﬁcation used
in the asset-pricing economy of Lucas (1978). In particular, models that al-
low for counter-cyclical risk aversion have been shown to perform much better
than the standard model (see, for example, Campbell and Cochrane (1999),
Gordon and St-Amour (2000), and Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001)).1
While these models all seem reasonable, the lack of an axiomatic foundation
makes it diﬃcult to assess their structural integrity and to impose a homoth-
etic structure on preferences.2 In this paper, we adopt an axiomatic approach
to the speciﬁcation of risk preferences. Our axioms result in a one-parameter
extension of the Gul (1991) disappointment aversion utility function. Our
extension to Gul results in preferences that have the desirable property that,
when embedded in a dynamic asset-pricing economy, eﬀective risk aversion can
counter-cyclical. Moreover, the state-prices that our risk-preference assump-
tions generate are precisely those that rationalize the equity-premium puzzle
of Mehra and Prescott (1985).
Melino and Yang (2002) provide a useful characterization of the need for
counter-cyclical risk aversion by directly calculating the pricing kernel that
resolves the equity-premium puzzle. Setting the ﬁrst two moments of con-
sumption growth equal to their historical estimates in the U.S., E[x]=1 .018,
V [x]=0 .0362, and Corr[xt,x t−1]=−0.14, consumption growth is calibrated
as a two-state Markov process with the state space for growth rates given by
1Campbell and Cochrane (1999) capture counter-cyclical risk aversion through an exter-
nal habit with a time-varying “habit sensitivity.” Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001) and
Barberis and Huang (2001) create this with an ad hoc utility function that features a time-
varying loss aversion (a direct disutility from negative stock market returns). Gordon and
St-Amour (2000) take a more direct approach and calibrate a time-varying risk aversion.
2To compensate for the lack of homotheticity, Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001), for
example, introduce a time-varying scaling to the loss aversion to force stationarity. Similarly,
the non-stationarity of Gordon and St-Amour (2000) preferences restricts their application
to a ﬁnite-horizon economy.







Melino and Yang then choose an asset-pricing kernel represented by a stochas-
tic process Mt, that exactly matches the historical means and variances of
equity and bond returns of E[R]=1 .07, V [R]=0 .1652, E[r]=1 .008,
and V [r]=0 .0562, and satisﬁes the usual arbitrage-free pricing condition,
Et[Mt+1Ri
t+1] = 1. The resulting just-identiﬁed pricing kernel is given by the










The ﬁrst row of equation (2) is the kernel when the current state is a recession
denoted as L (i.e., low consumption growth), the second row is the kernel
conditional on being in an expansion denoted as H (i.e., high consumption
growth). It is immediately apparent why a traditional time-additive expected
utility function will have diﬃculty matching historical asset-return behavior.
Note that the transition probabilities are not dramatically diﬀerent in the re-
cession and expansion state (πLL/πLH =0 .75 and πLL/πLH =1 .33). However,
the pricing kernel is dramatically diﬀerent across the two states. In the xt = L
state, there is a large diﬀerence in the price of $1 contingent on xt+1 = L
versus xt+1 = H, suggesting a high degree of risk aversion in the standard
model (MLL/MLH =7 .63). However, in the xt = H state the price of $1 in
xt+1 = L and xt+1 = H are very similar, suggesting a very low degree of risk
aversion in the standard model (MLL/MLH =1 .18). To capture the dynamics
of asset returns requires an eﬀective risk-aversion that is both state dependent
and counter-cyclical (i.e., higher risk aversion in the low-growth state).
Thus far, axiomatic preferences that can accommodate experimental re-
sults have had little success in capturing the dynamic pattern of asset prices
displayed in equation (2). For example, Gul (1991) is an axiomatic characteri-
zation of preferences that allows for an asymmetric treatment of the outcomes
2of a lottery based on where the outcomes lie relative to an implicit certainty
equivalent. In essence, outcomes below the certainty equivalent are disap-
pointing and, hence, receive relatively more weight in the utility calculation
of a disappointment-averse agent. Gul’s relaxation of the von Neumann and
Morgenstern (1947) independence axiom yields preferences that are consistent
with the Allais Paradox. For portfolio choice and asset pricing, the impor-
tant manifestation of these preferences is “ﬁrst-order” risk-aversion (Epstein
and Zin (1990), Ang, Bekaert, and Liu (2002)). That is, for gambles local
to certainty, risk aversion is ﬁrst-order and indiﬀerence curves in state-space
have a kink at certainty. Unfortunately, Gul preferences have little success in
explaining asset returns. In a Lucas-tree endowment economy in which the
representative agent has disappointment aversion the ﬁrst-order risk aversion
is not of ﬁrst-order importance since the endowment, and hence the equilib-
rium optimal consumption plan, is not local to certainty. Analogous to the
conclusion of Mehra and Prescott (1985), the calibrated disappointment aver-
sion needed to generate a large equity premium seems unreasonably high and
the model is still unable to capture many of the important patterns in the
historical asset returns (see Epstein and Zin (2001)).
In this paper, we provide an axiomatic model of preferences over atempo-
ral risks that generalizes the disappointment aversion model. We extend the
Gul (1991) model by modifying the deﬁnition of a disappointing outcome to
allow for a focus on more extreme outcomes (i.e., generalized disappointment
aversion). That is, an outcome is disappointing only when it is suﬃciently
far from the implicit certainty equivalent.3 This moves the locus of ﬁrst-order
risk aversion away from certainty. The advantage of these preferences is that
we can disentangle the slope of preferences at the endowment from the level
of the certainty equivalent. The slope of the indiﬀerence curve determines the
price of risk while the level of the certainty equivalent drives the risk-free in-
terest rate. Because our approach is axiomatic, we can maintain the analytic
3In Gul (1991) and our extension, the reference point that deﬁnes disappointment is
internal to the gamble being considered. In contrast, Sagi (2003) considers axioms that
allow an external reference point as in models of loss aversion.
3appeal of properties like homotheticity. However, the structure placed on pref-
erences by other axioms (e.g., continuity and monotonicity) restrict the degree
of ﬁrst-order risk aversion. In state-space, a kink away from certainty must be
less severe. To investigate the quantitative implications of these preferences,
we embed our model of atemporal preferences in the recursive utility model
of Epstein and Zin (1989). In this setting, our preference speciﬁcation yields
tractable Euler equations which facilitate calibration and empirical analysis.
Our calibration results show that the equilibrium asset returns in the Mehra
and Prescott (1985) version of a Lucas-tree economy in which the represen-
tative agent has generalized disappointment aversion, is not much of an im-
provement over Gul’s disappointment aversion, which is not much of an im-
provement over standard expected utility. That is, none of these models can
produce the Melino and Yang kernel of equation (2). On the other hand, a
small departure from the Mehra-Prescott calibration that introduces a small
amount of conditional heteroskedasticity, while maintaining all other features
of their calibration, creates an environment in which generalized disappoint-
ment aversion preferences are able to capture the state-dependent risk aversion
described above, and exactly match the pricing-kernel that resolves the equity-
premium puzzle.
The paper is organized by starting with the axiomatic foundations of gen-
eralized disappointment aversion (GDA) in Section 2. Along with the axioms,
several of the properties of the resulting GDA utility function are presented.
Section 3 presents the inﬁnite horizon, Lucas-tree economy using the GDA
preferences along with a calibration to the Melino and Yang kernel of equation
(2). Section 3.2 explains why GDA preferences are not able to improve on ex-
isting models in replicating the observed data. We then propose a small change
in the calibration to introduce conditional heteroskedasticity and demonstrate
that GDA preferences can dramatically improve the performance of the asset-
pricing model. Section 4 points to directions for future research and concludes.
42 Generalized Disappointment Aversion
In this section, we present the axioms which are necessary and suﬃcient for
a generalization of Gul (1991) disappointment aversion. Some readers may
prefer to move directly to the asset pricing model of Section 3. In that sec-
tion, we use a one-parameter extension of Gul disappointment aversion where
the functional form for risk preferences is a linearly homogeneous certainty
















α α ≤ 1,α =0
log(x) α =0
α is a risk aversion parameter and β ≥ 0, and δ ≤ 1 capture disappoint-
ment aversion. If β = 0, the preferences are equivalent to expected utility
with constant relative risk aversion parameter α.I fδ = 1, the preferences are
equivalent to Gul disappointment aversion. Disappointment averse preferences
imply a penalty for outcomes below the certainty equivalence when β>0.
We generalize Gul preferences by modifying the deﬁnition of disappointment.
Preferences with δ<1 capture non-central disappointment aversion by mov-
ing the disappointment cut-oﬀ. Outcomes are disappointing only if they lie
suﬃciently far below the certainty equivalent. As mentioned previously, this
allows for ﬁrst-order-risk-aversion eﬀects away from certainty, and is the key
feature of our calibrated asset-pricing economy. The axiomatic derivation of
this utility representation, its properties, and some extensions are developed
in the remainder of this section.
52.1 Maintained Axioms
Let X =[ x0,x 0] be the set of monetary outcomes and L be the set of ﬁnite-
support lotteries on X. Lotteries that assign probability one to a single x ∈ X
are denoted simply as x.L e t  be a binary relation on L using the standard
notation of p   q means p is strictly preferred to q, p   q denotes weakly
preferred, and p ∼ q denotes indiﬀerence.
Axiom 0 – Monotonicity: For x,y ∈ X, x   y if and only if x>y
Axiom 1 – Preference Relation:   is complete and transitive.
Axiom 2 – Continuity: For all p ∈L , the sets {q|q   p} and {q|p   q} are
closed.4
These axioms imply that the certainty equivalent µ : L→X (i.e, µ(p) ∼ p)i s
a well deﬁned function.
2.2 Disappointment Aversion
The two central axioms in Gul are Weak Independence and Symmetry. Both
axioms rely on the deﬁnition of an elation/disappointment decomposition. We
modify the decompositions used in Gul in a straightforward fashion and deﬁne
sets Bδ and Wδ as follows.
Bδ(p)={q|x ∈ supp(q) → x ≥ δµ(p)}
Wδ(p)={q|x ∈ supp(q) → x ≤ δµ(p)}
(4)
where δ ≤ 1 is a parameter. Next, deﬁne decompositions of a lottery as
α ∈ [0,1] and q,r ∈Lsuch that p = αq +( 1− α)r with q ∈ Bδ(p)a n d
r ∈ Wδ(p). The lottery p is decomposed into two lotteries. Lottery q has zero
probability on all elements below the threshold δµ(p) while lottery r has zero
4Using the topology generated by the L1 metric. See Gul (1991).
6probability for outcomes above the threshold. The parameter δ determines
the location of the disappointment threshold. By focusing on the certainty
equivalent, Gul’s disappointment averse preferences have a central measure of
disappointment. This is captured here with δ = 1. Our generalization allows
for a non-central, δ<1, characterization of disappointment.
The expected utility axiom of independence states that p1   p2 implies
λp1 +( 1− λ)x   λp2 +( 1− λ)x. This axiom is frequently violated in ex-
periments. The Allais Paradox, for example, is perhaps the most familiar
violation (see, Allais (1979) Conlisk (1989) Machina (1987)). Following Gul,
the decomposition facilitates characterizing preferences that are averse to dis-
appointment by overweighting (relative to their probabilities) outcomes below
the disappointment threshold. This asymmetric weighting is a weakening of
the independence axiom. Speciﬁcally, the independence axiom need not hold if
p1 and p2 assign diﬀerent probability weight to disappointing outcomes. This
is stated in axiom 3.
Axiom 3 – δ-Weak Independence: For all p ∈Land λ ∈ (0,1) µ(p) ∼
λp +( 1− λ)µ(p). There exists a δ ≤ 1 such that for all p1,p 2 ∈Lwith
p1   p2, λ ∈ (0,1),a n dx ∈ X, λp1 +( 1− λ)x   λp2 +( 1− λ)x if (1)
Wδ(pj) ∩ Wδ(λpj +( 1− λ)x)=∅ for j =1 ,2, or (2) there exits an α ∈ [0,1]
and qj,r j ∈Lsuch that for j =1 ,2
pj = αqj +( 1− α)rj
qj ∈ Bδ(pj) ∩ Bδ(λpj +( 1− λ)x)
rj ∈ Wδ(pj) ∩ Wδ(λpj +( 1− λ)x).
(5)
The axiom is the direct analog to Weak Independence in Gul. The axiom allows
for preferences to not satisfy the independence axiom when disappointment is
a concern. As with Gul, the decompositions of pj in equation (5) place the
same probability, 1 − α, on the disappointing outcomes. The restriction that
qj ∈ Bδ(pj)a n dqj ∈ Bδ(λpj +( 1− λ)x) and, similarly rj ∈ Wδ(pj)a n d
rj ∈ Wδ(λpj +(1−λ)x) implies that mixing in the payoﬀ, x, has not changed
7the nature of disappointment. We will refer to the Gul case of δ =1a s
Central Weak Independence and δ<1 as Non-Central Weak Independence.
With δ<1, it is possible that no outcomes are disappointing, Wδ(pj)=
Wδ(λpj +( 1− λ)x)=∅. In this case, the usual independence axiom holds.
Lastly, the axiom requires preferences to satisfy the betweenness property
µ(p) ∼ λp +( 1− λ)µ(p). This requirement is redundant in the case of δ =1
(see Gul (1991)) and δ<
x0
x0 (see Property 5 below). However, it is required for
intermediate values of δ to ensure preferences are linear in probabilities (i.e.,
linear indiﬀerence curves on a probability simplex).
The ﬁnal axiom used by Gul is Symmetry. This axiom requires that out-
comes above and below the disappointment cut-oﬀ be evaluated using the same
outcome valuation function. The axiom is stated considering lotteries pj that
have the property that all outcomes in the support of pj are disappointing in
the lottery αx0 +( 1− α)pj (recall x0 is the largest possible lottery payoﬀ)
but not-disappointing in the lottery αpj +( 1− α)x0 (x0 is the worst possible
payoﬀ).
Axiom 4 – δ-Symmetry: Given a δ from Axiom 3, for all p1,p 2 ∈L
and α ∈ [0,1] such that for j =1 ,2, pj ∈ Bδ (αpj +( 1− α)x0) and pj ∈
Wδ (αx0 +( 1− α)pj)
αp1 +( 1− α)x0   αp2 +( 1− α)x0 iﬀ
αx0 +( 1− α)p1   αx0 +( 1− α)p2
(6)
Note the same disappointment cut-oﬀ, δµ,i su s e di nA x i o m4a si nA x i o m3 .
2.3 Preference Representation
To characterize disappointment aversion preferences, it is helpful to start with
the general class of preferences that are linear in probabilities (i.e., satisfy the
8betweenness property) and then consider the restrictions imposed by δ-Weak
Independence and δ-Symmetry. Dekel (1986) and Chew (1989) characterize
preferences that satisfy betweenness as a certainty equivalent µ(p)t h a ts o l v e s
 
xi∈X p(xi)U (xi,µ(p)) = 0. As shown in the lemma in the appendix, we can
deﬁne functions u, Dk,a n dLk (whose properties are stated in the appendix)
















Equation (7) deﬁnes the certainty equivalence of lottery p as µ(p)=M(p,µ(p))
and p   q if and only if µ(p) ≥ µ(q). The function, M(p,m), calculates the
expected utility, using u(·), of lottery p minus penalties, denoted Lk(x,m),
for outcomes that lie below the cut-oﬀs ∆k(m). Note βk = 0 for all k is
equivalent to expected utility. Gul’s disappointment aversion has just one
cut-oﬀ (βk = 0 for all k>1) at ∆1(m)=m, and a linear penalty function
L1(x,m)=u(m) − u(x).
Theorem:   satisﬁes Axioms 0-3 if and only if they are represented by
µ(p)=M(p,µ(p)) in equation (7) with: K =1 , ∆1(m)=δm, L1(x,δm)=
 (δm) −  (x) with  (·) a continuous increasing function.   satisﬁes Axioms
0-4 if and only if in addition,  (·) is an aﬃne transformation of u(·) (e.g.,
 (x)=u(x)).
Proof: The Lemma in the see appendix shows that the betweenness prop-
erty implies the functional form of equation (7). In addition, ∆k(m)a n d
Lk(x,δk(m)) are increasing in x and decreasing in m, ensuring µ(p)=M(p,µ(p))
exists and is unique. Finally, Lk(x,∆k(m)) = 0 if x =∆ k(m). For exposi-
tional purposes, consider u(x)=x and X =[ 0 ,1], since extending to general
u(x)a n dX is straightforward.
9The δ-Weak Independence axiom can be stated as
if

     
     








(iii) z ∈{ x|x ∈ supp(pi)a n dx ≤ δµ(pi)}→z ≤ δµ(λpi +( 1− λ)x)
(iv) z ∈{ x|x ∈ supp(pi)a n dx ≥ δµ(pi)}→z ≥ δµ(λpi +( 1− λ)x)

     
     
then µ(λp1 +( 1− λ)x) ≥ µ(λp2 +( 1− λ)x).
(8)
Assume p1,p 2,a n dλ satisfy the necessary conditions of equation (8). For
notation, let µj = µ(pj)a n dˆ µj = µ(λpj +( 1− λ)x). Consider equation (7)
with one cut-oﬀ (K =1 ) .







+(1 − λ)x − (1 − λ)βL(xi,∆(ˆ µi))1{x≤∆(ˆ µj)}
where 1{·} is an indicator function. For β>0 and for arbitrary ∆(m)a n d
L(x,∆(m)), it will not be the case that ˆ µ1 > ˆ µ2. Satisfying Weak Indepen-
dence requires that ∆(m)=δm (hence K = 1 and there can be no other
cut-oﬀs). This implies











x − βL(x,δˆ µj)1{x≤δˆ µj}
 
.
By parts (iii)a n d( iv)o f( 8 ) ,








x − βL(x,δˆ µj)1{x≤δˆ µj}
 
(9)
Again, for arbitrary L(x,δm) we can construct lotteries such that ˆ µ2 > ˆ µ1
(violating weak independence). It must therefore be the case that the loss
10function is separable in x and δm. The restriction that L(x,δm)=0i fx =
δm means that an additively separable loss function must be of the form
L(m,x)= (δm) −  (x), where  (·) is an increasing function. Inserting this








ˆ µj = λµj + λβα[ (δµj) −  (δˆ µj)] + (1 − λ)
 
x − β[ (δˆ µj) −  (x)]1{x≤ˆ µj}
 
In this form, it is clear that if µ1 >µ 2 then ˆ µ1 > ˆ µ2 satisfying weak indepen-
dence.
Next consider the role of the symmetry axiom. For lotteries p1 and p2,l e t
µjb = µ(αx0 +( 1− α)pj)a n dµjw = µ(αpj +( 1− α)x0). We calculate these
certainty equivalents next, using the fact that pj ∈ B (αpj +( 1− α)x0)a n d








pj(xi)( (δµjw) −  (xi))
 




pj(xi)xi +( 1− α)[w − β( (δµjw) −  (x0))]
, (10)
and







pj(xi)( (δµjb) −  (xi))
 







pj ( (xi)) −  (δµjb)
  .
(11)
µjw depends on pj only through the ﬁrst moment (the ﬁrst term of equation
(10)). However, µjb depends on the ﬁrst moment of p as well as moments
generated by  (·)( n o t e
 
pj(xi) (xi) in equation (11)). Symmetry requires
that µ1b ≥ µ2b if and only if µ1w ≥ µ2w. The only way this condition can be
satisﬁed for all lotteries is for the penalty function to be aﬃne, e.g.,  (x)=x
or more generally,  (·)=u(·)
112.4 Properties of Generalized Disappointment Aversion
The preference representation in the Theorem suggest two directions for ex-
tending Gul’s disappointment aversion. We can consider central (δ =1 )a n d
non-central (δ<1) deﬁnitions of disappointment. In addition, we can relax
the symmetry axiom by adopting a non-linear penalty function,  (·). Unfortu-
nately, as we show below, symmetry is necessary for linear homogeneity of the



















where σ = 1 satisﬁes the Symmetry axiom.
Property 1: The certainty equivalent, µ(p), implicitly deﬁned by equation
(12) is unique and is a continuous function of p.
Although this fact is a direct implication of Theorem 1, it is helpful to
note that ﬁnding the certainty equivalent is a simple ﬁxed-point calculations.


















M is a continuous function that is (weakly) decreasing in m.F o rc o n t i n u i t y ,
it is important to note that at the disappointment threshold of xi = δˆ µ,
(δm)ασ − (xi)ασ = 0. Suppose δM(p,m) <mfor all m.I nt h i sc a s e ,p has no





i . Alternatively, there exists a unique ﬁxed point
µ(p)=M(p,µ(p)) which is continuous by the implicit function theorem.
Property 2: µ(x)=x.
Simply verify that M(x,x)α = xα.
12Property 3: An increase in β or δ increases risk aversion in that the
certainty equivalent falls; i.e., ∂µ(p)/∂β ≤ 0 and ∂µ(p)/∂δ ≤ 0.
This follows from equation (13). Note that ∂M(p,m)/∂β ≤ 0a n d∂M(p,m)/∂δ ≤
0 for all m.
Property 4: If σ ≥ 1,a ni n c r e a s ei nσ increases risk aversion in that the
certainty equivalent declines; i.e., ∂µ(p)/∂σ ≤ 0
Similarly, this follows from equation (13).
Property 5: The preferences characterized by equation (3) are equivalent
to expected utility if β =0 , δ ≤
x0
x0,o rσ =0 .
It is obvious from the speciﬁcations in equation (3) that β = 0 produces
expected utility. δ ≤
x0
x0 implies that for all lotteries, δµ(p) ≤ x0 so there are no
lotteries with disappointing outcomes. That is, for all p ∈L ,
 
xi≤δm
p(xi) = 0 for
all m ≥ x0. Again, by equation (13), this implies expected utility preferences.
Similarly, by inspection of equation (13), σ = 0 is identical to expected utility.
Property 6: Preferences in (3) are identical to Gul (1991) disappointment
aversion when δ =1and σ =1 .
Note that axiom 1 and 2 are identical to Gul and axioms 3 is identical to
Gul’s axioms when δ = 1. Finally, axiom 4 is satisﬁed only if σ =1( o rw h e n
preferences are expected utility).
Property 7: µ(p) deﬁned by equation (3) is linearly homogeneous only if
the Symmetry Axiom is satisﬁed (i.e., σ =1 ).
Consider two lotteries, p and pa such that p has probabilities [p1,p 2,...]
and payoﬀs [x1,x 2,...] while pa has identical probabilities [p1,p 2,...] but pay-
oﬀs [ax1,ax 2,...] for a>0. From equation (13), note that M(pa,am)α =
[aM(p,m)]α for all m only in the case where σ = 1 or where preferences are
identical to expected utility, that is, the Symmetry Axiom is satisﬁed.
13Asymmetric disappointment aversion may be an interesting direction for
future research. Since it allows for a diﬀerent degree of risk aversion over
disappointing outcomes, it is similar to Chew (1989) weighted utility. It also
has the potential to generate preferences that are analogous to the “S-shaped”
valuation function in Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky (1979)). Un-
fortunately, the lack of homothetheticity makes the preferences diﬃcult to use
in an asset pricing setting.
Consider the case where δ<1 but σ = 1. In this setting, there are
several alternative ways to write the preferences. Equation (3) has a “penalty”
for outcomes below the certainty equivalence. This is the format used in
implementation of Gul disappointment aversion in Epstein and Zin (2001).
When the penalty is linear (σ = 1), one can write the preferences in a similar













where 1{·} is an indicator function and
a =P r o b{x>δ µ (p)} +P r o b{x ≤ δµ(p)}(1 + βδ
α). (15)
In this format, preferences are similar to expected utility where the probability
of a disappointing outcome is re-weighted to capture the disappointment.
2.5 Indiﬀerence Curves
To understand the role of the axioms and resulting utility function, it is helpful
to compare indiﬀerence curves in both the probability simplex and in state-
space for expected utility, Gul disappointment aversion, and our Generalized
Disappointment Aversion. Figure 1 shows a probability simplex over the pay-
oﬀs x1 <x 2 <x 3. In these examples, let X =[ x1,x 3]. Each line represents
14lotteries p =[ p(x1),p(x2),p(x3)]
  that have the same utility, µ(p)=x. Indif-
ference curves are extended outside the simplex only to facilitate exposition
and comparison. In Figure 1 preferences are expected utility (β =0 ,δ can be
arbitrary). Notice that as implied by the independence axiom, the indiﬀerence
curves are linear and parallel.
It is also helpful to consider indiﬀerence curves in state-space where prob-
abilities of two states are ﬁxed at p(x1)=p(x2)=1
2 and the lottery payoﬀs
are varied. Figure 2 shows the familiar smooth trade-oﬀ between state 1 and
state 2 payoﬀs implied by expected utility.
Figure 3 displays Gul Disappointment Aversion preferences (β =2 .0, and,
by deﬁnition, δ =1 .0). The axioms imply the “betweenness” property or
that indiﬀerence sets are linear (i.e., p ∼ λp +( 1− λ)µ(p)). However, unlike
expected utility in Figure 1, indiﬀerence curves are not parallel. The main
structure of Disappointment Aversion preferences can be seen by considering
the three indiﬀerence sets deﬁned by µ(p)=xi for i =1 ,2,3. (For comparison,
these three indiﬀerence lines are highlighted in Figure 1 as well.) At µ(p)=
1.0, nothing is disappointing since this is the worst possible outcome and
preferences are identical to expected utility. Next consider µ(p)=x2.T h e
slope of the indiﬀerence curve is controlled by the parameter β. Since axiom
3 relaxes the independence axiom, the slope of µ(p)=x2 can diﬀer from the
slope of µ(p)=x1. Below the threshold µ(p)=x2 (lower right hand portion
of Figure 3) only outcome x1 is disappointing. Therefore, Axiom 3 places
structure on preferences for lotteries p1 and p2 only if p1(x1)=p2(x1) (lie on
the same vertical plane). This produces the “fan” pattern in the lower right.
Similarly, for lotteries above the µ(p)=x2 threshold, both x1 and x2 are
disappointing. In this region, Axiom 3 inﬂuences preferences for lotteries if
p1(x1)+p1(x2)=p2(x1)+p2(x2) (lotteries lie on same horizontal plane). Again,
this produces the “fan” pattern. Finally, Axiom 4 induces the symmetry
between the two regions (reﬂected about the µ(p)=x2 line). For example,
symmetry implies that µ(p)=x3, where every outcome is disappointing, is
parallel to µ(p)=x1 and, hence, consistent with expected utility.
15Figure 4 shows the indiﬀerence curve for disappointment aversion in state-
space. Since disappointment is deﬁned relative to the certainty equivalent, the
indiﬀerence curve has a kink at certainty. Below the forty-ﬁve degree line, it
is the state two outcome (vertical axis) while above the forty-ﬁve degree line,
the state one outcome is disappointing. The β parameter controls how much
extra weight the disappointing outcome receives and, hence, the sharpness of
the kink.
Finally, Figure 5 shows the indiﬀerence lotteries for GDA (β =2 .0, and
δ =0 .8) where utility is both “Gul-like” and “expected-utility-like.” Again,
there are three indiﬀerence curves to focus on, µ(p)=
xi
δ for i =1 ,2,3. Here,
the threshold certainty equivalents are all shifted by the preference parame-
ter δ. For certainty equivalents less than
x1
δ , no outcomes are disappointing.
For lotteries below µ(p)=
x1
δ , preferences are identical to expected utility
and indiﬀerence curves are parallel. The indiﬀerence curve at µ(p)=
x2
δ is
the threshold where x2 is disappointing. As in disappointment aversion, the
parameter β determines the slope of this indiﬀerence set. As with disappoint-
ment aversion in Figure 1, axiom 3 inﬂuences preferences diﬀerently above and
below this threshold producing the “fanning” behavior. Finally, Axiom 4, the
symmetry, acts in a similar manner to generate symmetric preferences about
the µ(p)=
x2
δ threshold. Note that ﬁctitious lotteries with µ(p)=
x3
δ (which is
a certainty equivalent above the best outcome x3), that have the property that
all outcomes are disappointing which, by the symmetry axiom, is equivalent
to expected utility and parallel to µ(p)=
x1
δ .
Figure 6 shows an indiﬀerence curve for GDA in state space. Here, dis-
appointment occurs for outcomes less than δ =0 .8 times the certainty equiv-
alence. For gambles close to certainty (shown as the center cone in Figure
6), preferences are identical to expected utility since neither outcome is dis-
appointing. This is analogous to the lower right hand portion of Figure 5.
Lotteries where state 2 payoﬀ is very low (below the cone) are disappointing.
Similarly for low state 1 payoﬀs. Note that the kink in the indiﬀerence curves
is not at certainty. Here the kink occurs where the x1 or x2 is at the δµ(p)
16threshold. Finally, as long as u(x) is homothetic, GDA preferences are also
homothetic. For diﬀerent utility levels, all kinks lie along the rays that deﬁne
t h ec o n ei nF i g u r e6 .
Figures 2, 4 and 6 also show the role of β and δ eﬀect on eﬀective risk
aversion. In Disappointment Aversion, Figure 4, an increase in β increases
the severity of the kink and makes the preferences exhibit more risk aversion.
This is also true in GDA in Figure 4. However, as δ decreases and the dis-
appointment threshold is moved further away from certainty, the kink and
eﬀective risk aversion decreases. Monotonicity of preferences limits the kink
since preferences can, at most, be a vertical (horizontal) line. When we turn to
the empirical implementation of the model we will explore this tension further.
Locating the kink away from certainty allows the calibration to locate the kink
closer to the endowment. However, since the eﬀect of β is less dramatic, the
eﬀective disappointment aversion is reduced and preferences eﬀectively look
like expected utility.
3 Intertemporal Asset Pricing with GDA
We now embed our atemporal axiomatic preference model in a standard rep-
resentative agent asset-pricing economy, as in Epstein and Zin (1990). The
representative agent consumes a single perishable consumption good in each
period. In period t, current consumption, ct, is known with certainty, but
future consumption levels are generally uncertain. The intertemporal utility















,γ ≤ 1,ρ > 0 , (16)
where µt = µ(˜ Ut+1|It) as deﬁned by equation (3) is the certainty equivalent
of random future utility using the period-t conditional probability distribu-
tion. ρ is the marginal rate of time preference, and 1
1−γ is the elasticity of
17intertemporal substitution.
The representative agent’s economic environment is identical to that in
Mehra and Prescott (1985) and Melino and Yang (2002). In particular, the
endowment process {yt} is such that growth rates xt+1 =
yt+1
yt follow a ﬁrst-
order Markov process. The ex-dividend price of the single equity asset may
be described by the time-invariant and positive function p(xt,y t). In light of
the homogeneity of preferences (Property 7 and equation (16)) it follows that
price is linearly homogeneous in current output, i.e.,
p(x,y)=p(x,1)y = P(x)y, (17)
where P(x) is the price-dividend ratio. Denote by Rt+1 the return to equity
over the interval t to t + 1. This return depends only on the growth rate








In equilibrium, the agent maximizes utility, markets clear, and price expec-
tations are fulﬁlled. The Euler equation for utility maximization from Epstein











If we substitute the deﬁnition of the market return from equation (18) into this
Euler equation, and apply the property of linear homogeneity of the certainty
equivalent operator, then we obtain a recursive equation for the equilibrium











The equilibrium risk-free return is determined by the representative agent’s
portfolio choice between the risky equity return Rt+1 and a risk-free asset with
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t+1 = ω ˜ Rt+1 +( 1− ω)rt is the portfolio return. The equilibrium risk-
free return, occurs when the optimum of this portfolio choice problem is ω =1 .
That is, the risk-free asset is priced such that asset demands are consistent
with zero net supply.
Of particular interest for understanding some of the simple calibration
exercises below, will be the version of our model that is linear-in-states. When




ω ˜ Rt+1 +( 1− ω)rt
 
.
Consider an outcome-valuation function that is homogeneous of degree one
(i.e., α = 1 in equation (3)). Given the linear homogeneity of µ, equation (21)
reduces further to
max
ω [ωµt( ˜ Rt+1)+( 1− ω)rt],
Note that in this special case the certainty equivalent is a linear operator. This
implies that, in equilibrium,
µt( ˜ Rt+1)=rt.






Therefore, in the equilibrium
µt( ˜ Rt+1)=rt =1+ρ. (22)
Note that this linear speciﬁcation with α =1a n dγ = 1 represents risk-
19neutrality only in the expected utility model. For generalized disappointment
aversion models with β>0, (see equation (3)), the certainty equivalent will
exhibit risk aversion.
3.1 Calibration
To investigate the quantitative implications of our model of risk preferences,
we adopt the two-state calibration of the endowment-growth process described
in Mehra and Prescott (1985). As described in the introduction, the expected
value of and standard deviation of the endowment growth rate are 1.018 and
0.036, respectively. For a symmetric ergodic distribution, i.e., an unconditional
probability of 0.5, the two growth-rate states are xL =1 .018 − 0.036 = 0.982
and xH =1 .018 + 0.036 = 1.054. The ﬁrst-order autocorrelation of these
growth rates is calibrated to be -0.14, which implies the Markov transition
matrix shown in equation (1).
Given this speciﬁcation for the exogenous endowment process and given
values for the parameters of the utility function, we can solve the equations
described above to determine the equilibrium asset returns. Given these re-
turns, we can solve for the 2-by-2 matrix deﬁning the equilibrium asset-pricing
kernel, M, that satisﬁes the 4 equations
MLLπLLRLL + MLHπLHRLH =1
MHLπHLRHL + MHHπHHRHH =1
MLLπLLrL + MLHπLHrL =1
MHLπHLrH + MHHπHHrH =1 . (23)
Our calibration approach is somewhat non-standard. We choose preference
parameters for each preference model so that the equilibrium asset-pricing
kernel, M, is as close (in a sum-of-squared-errors sense) as possible to the
matrix found by Melino and Yang (2002). That is, we ask how close can a
particular preference model get the the Melino-Yang pricing kernel given in
20equation (2). We have not tried to pre-specify preference parameters from
other empirical or experimental evidence. Of course, such evidence will be
relevant for evaluating the results of our numerical exercise.
The results of this calibration, along with the preference parameters, are
presented in Table 1. The table reports six preference models: time-additive
expected utility as in Mehra and Prescott (1985) (denoted EU), Kreps and
Porteus (1978) non-time-additive expected utility as in Epstein and Zin (1989)
(denoted KP), the Disappointment Aversion model of Gul (1991) (denoted
DA), Disappointment Aversion utility constrained to be linear in states (i.e.,
α is constrained to be equal to 1) (denoted DAL), Generalized Disappointment
Aversion (GDA), and ﬁnally Generalized Disappointment Aversion with the
constraint α = 1 (GDAL). For all models, the rate of time-preference is ﬁxed
at ρ =0 .01.
Despite the variety of preferences considered, all six models presented in
Table 1 generate roughly the same pricing kernels. None of these pricing ker-
nels exhibits the big diﬀerences in conditional behavior depicted in Melino
and Yang (2002). In other words, although each model has the potential to
generate diﬀerent risk premiums, diﬀerent risk-free interest rates and diﬀerent
volatility patterns in these returns, none of the models comes close to resolv-
ing the equity-premium puzzle. This is true even when the parameters of the
model are chosen with that speciﬁc goal in mind. Finally, note that the cur-
vature of u in the certainty equivalents for both disappointment aversion and
generalized disappointment aversion does not have much of a quantitative im-
pact in this two-state economy. Almost identical results obtain when a α =1
and a linear-in-states value function is used. This is, of course, not surprising
since both α and β induce risk aversion (see Property 3 or Figures 4 and 6).
3.2 Discussion
To understand where the GDA utility calibration may be useful, it is helpful
to consider a simpler two-period two-state model. In this setting, consump-
21tion is denoted c1 and c2. Today’s endowment, y1 is known. The growth rate
for tomorrow’s endowment can be xL or xH, which along with the consump-
tion/savings plan will produce period-two consumption of c2.F i g u r e7c h a r -
acterizes the representative agent’s problem. The lower left quadrant shows
preferences over risky consumption growth rates (xL,x H). The upper right
quadrant shows the intertemporal preference between certain (or certainty
equivalent) consumption plans (c1,µ(c2)). The endowment is (y1, ¯ xL, ¯ xH). In
Figure 7, preferences over atemporal gambles (lower-left quadrant) are stan-
dard expected utility. Equilibrium is given by setting state prices
pH
pL equal to
the slope of the indiﬀerence curve at the endowment growth rates (¯ xL, ¯ xH).
Where the indiﬀerence curve that runs through (¯ xL, ¯ xH) intersects certainty
(where xL = xH) determines the certainty equivalence of the period-two risky
endowment. This is denoted µ(¯ x). The upper-left quadrant simply maps
the certainty equivalence of risky growth-rates into period 2 consumption cer-
tainty equivalence. Since our certainty equivalence are linearly homogeneous,
µ(y2)=y1µ(˜ x)w h e r e˜ x is the (xL,x H) gamble. The equilibrium interest rate
is therefore set by the slope of the intertemporal trade-oﬀ at (y1,µ(y2)).
From Figure 7, one can see why the expected utility model struggles to
match the data. Consider the comparative static exercise of changing the
probabilities of the two states in a way analogous to the two-state inﬁnite
horizon probabilities in Melino and Yang (2002). That is, consider πH/πL =
0.75 or 1.33 (see equation (1)). Regardless of the risk aversion curvature,
one cannot duplicate the Melino and Yang (2002) state prices since small
change in probabilities cannot reproduce the dramatic variation in conditional
state prices. Note even with state-dependent risk aversion, that allows one
to match the conditional state prices (the pH/pL in the lower-left quadrant of
the ﬁgure), expected utility will produce a dramatic variation in the certainty
equivalents of the consumption growth. This translates into an interest rate
that is excessively volatile.
In contrast, Figure 8 shows the two-period economy with a representative
agent with GDA utility over growth rates. By choice of the parameters δ,
22the kink in the utility function can be located closer to the endowment. The
eﬀect is to separate the slope of the utility function at (¯ xL, ¯ xH) (determining
state prices
pH
pL) from the certainty equivalence that determines the interest
rate. If we consider the same comparative static exercise as above (consider
πH/πL =0 .75 or 1.33), the β parameter allows one to overweight the dis-
appointing outcomes and eﬀectively exaggerate the small probability change
into a larger eﬀect on the state prices. Since the kink is near the endowment,
this exaggeration of state prices is done without generating much variation
in the certainty equivalence and hence without inducing a volatile risk-free
rate. However, as noted earlier, the continuity and monotonicity restrictions
on preferences limit the amount of the kink. As such, it is hard to gener-
ate a β that is large enough to reproduce the Melino and Yang (2002) state
prices. This is seen in Table 1. None of the preference models can reproduce
the Melino-Yang prices. Ideally, what we need is for the endowment to lie on
either side of the disappointment threshold in a state-dependent way. While
this is hard to demonstrate in a picture (since the endowment growth rates is
ﬁxed), we explore if this is feasible in the in the inﬁnite horizon case below.
As is shown next, Generalized Disappointment Aversion can generate the ef-
fective state-dependent risk aversion if the endowment growth process has a
small degree of heteroskedasticity.
3.3 Calibration with Conditional Volatility
Building on the intuition from the previous discussion, we consider a slightly
diﬀerent calibration of the exogenous endowment-growth process than in Mehra
and Prescott (1985). Although it seems relatively innocuous to assume a sym-
metric ergodic distribution (p =1 /2), this assumption rules out conditional
heteroskedasticity the in two-state models. Since there is ample evidence
from both macroeconomic and ﬁnancial-markets data that indicates condi-
tional volatility as an empirical fact, it is worth exploring in greater detail.
In particular, the emphasis Generalized Disappointment Aversion places on
23extreme tail events suggests that conditional heteroskedasticity may be im-
portant to distinguish GDA preferences from other preference models in a
dynamic economy.
The conditional means of the endowment growth process in the 2-state
model are given by






=( 1 − θ)µx + θxL
and






=( 1 − θ)µx + θxH
where µx and σx are the unconditional (ergodic) mean and standard deviation,
p is the ergodic probability of x = xL,a n dθ is the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation
coeﬃcient.
The conditional variances are given by























Note that the diﬀerence in conditional variances is given by
V (xt+1|xt = xL) − V (xt+1|xt = xH)=2 θ
1 − 2p
p(1 − p)
As noted, the only case in which there is no conditional heteroskedasticity
in the 2-state model is precisely the Mehra-Prescott calibration with equal
ergodic probability on the two states (p = .5).
24Consider two relatively small changes to the Melino-Yang exercise. First,
we introduce a small amount of conditional heteroskedasticity into the endowment-
growth process by assuming an ergodic probability of the low growth state of











Note the conditional standard deviation in the low state is 0.0342, and in the
high state it is 0.0366. Given the unconditional standard deviation is equal
to 0.036, this is a reasonably small amount of conditional heteroskedasticity.
Second, we set the risk-free interest rate to a constant equal to the rate of
time preference, rt =1 .01 for all t. The average equity premium we try to
match is 0.08, a slight increase over Mehra-Prescott. Re-solving the equations
in Melino and Yang (2002) with these assumptions results in a pricing kernel










This pricing kernel exhibits that same patterns as the Melino-Yang matrix in
equation (2) and is an equally challenging test for asset-pricing theories. Table
2 displays results for this calibration. What is striking about the results in
Table 2 is the perfect ﬁt of the generalized disappointment aversion preferences.
This ﬁt occurs even though we have ﬁxed the curvature parameter in the u of
equation (3) at the value α =1 .
To understand this rather surprising result, consider equation (22) and the
gambles implied by an ownership claim to equity. The matrix of equity returns






















The important diﬀerence in these two matrices lies in comparing the small-
est value in each row. In the Mehra-Prescott economy in equation (27), the
smallest return in the ﬁrst row, 1.0238 in event (L,L), is larger than the
smallest value in the second row, 0.8631. In our calibration with conditional
heteroskedasticity in equation (26), the smallest value in the ﬁrst row, 0.9227
is smaller than the smallest element in the second row, 0.9400. The reason this
is important is that Generalized Disappointment Aversion preferences may al-
low the conditional outcomes in the second row (expansion state) to not be
disappointing while outcomes in the ﬁrst row (recession state) are potentially
disappointing. That is, there is a value of δ such that δµt < 0.9400 when
xt = xH but have δµt > 0.9227 when xt = xL. In this situation, the investor
will behave in a risk-neutral fashion when they are in the “high” state, and
a very risk-averse fashion when they are in the “low” state. GDA eﬀectively
creates state-dependent risk aversion. Note that this is not possible for Mehra-
Prescott calibration in equation (27). In addition, eﬀective state dependent
risk aversion is not possible if δ = 1. Standard disappointment aversion cannot
reproduce the dynamic features of asset prices. Beyond this two-state calibra-
tion, this type of state-dependent risk aversion will arise whenever there are
signiﬁcantly more lower-tail events in one conditional probability distribution
than in another, hence, the important role played by conditional heteroskedas-
ticity in our calibration.
4 Conclusion
We have provided an axiomatic generalization of the disappointment aversion
preferences of Gul (1991) which allow for a more ﬂexible deﬁnition of a “disap-
pointing” outcome. In particular, our one-parameter extension of Gul’s utility
26function allows us to characterize outcomes in a lottery as disappointing not
when they lie below that lottery’s certainty equivalent, but rather when they
are suﬃciently far below the certainty equivalent. This focus on more extreme
tail behavior is consistent with real-world approaches such as “Value at Risk”
calculations in ﬁnance (see Basak and Shapiro (2001)), and with much of the
behavioral/experimental evidence, such as Kahneman and Tversky (1979).
Like Gul’s approach, our generalization maintains the key assumptions of lin-
earity of indiﬀerence curves on the probability simplex, linear homogeneity
of certainty equivalents, monotonicity (ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance), and
risk aversion (second-order stochastic dominance), while allowing for depar-
tures from the independence axiom of expected utility. These features were
shown in Epstein and Zin (2001) to play a key role in formulating tractable
dynamic asset-pricing models that allow for risk-preferences that depart from
expected utility in empirically relevant ways.
When we embed our new model of risk preferences in a Lucas-tree asset-
pricing economy, we ﬁnd that its quantitative importance is linked to the
existence of a small amount of conditional heteroskedasticity in the 2-state
Markov process for the endowment growth. If homoskedasticity is assumed as
in Mehra and Prescott (1985), our model oﬀers little improvement over existing
models. On the other hand, in the presence of a relatively small amount of
heteroskedasticity, our model generates state-prices that are consistent with
the historical patterns of equity and bond returns as delineated in Mehra and
Prescott (1985). In particular, our preference speciﬁcation generates eﬀective
risk aversion that is both state-dependent and counter-cyclical. The empirical
ﬁnance literature has highlighted the importance of these two properties as
necessary features of any asset pricing model that is likely to ﬁt the data.
Moreover, our axiomatic approach allows us to have a deeper understanding
of the origins of this time-varying risk aversion and allows us to better evaluate
the structural stability of our preference parameters.
Future research will take further advantage of the tractability of the Eu-
ler equations in our model to explore the empirical implications of our new
27preference speciﬁcation using both Hansen-Jagannathan bounds and GMM es-
timation as in Epstein and Zin (2001) and general-equilibrium term-structure
puzzles as in Backus, Gregory, and Zin (1989). In addition, we will explore the
usefulness of our model for understanding partial-equilibrium portfolio-choices.
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30Appendix
Lemma: Preferences satisfy axioms 0,1,2, and “betweenness,” if and only if there exists
(i) u : X → [0,1] continuous, increasing
(ii)∆ k : X → X continuous, increasing
∆k(m) < ∆k+1(m) for all m ∈ X, k =1 ,...,K − 1,
and ∆K(m) ≥ x0 for all m
(iii) Lk(x,m):[ 0 ,1]2 → R continuous, decreasing in x, increasing in m
















such that µ(p)=M(p,µ(p)) and p   q if and only if µ(p) ≥ µ(q).
Proof: Dekel (1986) and Chew (1989) show that preferences satisfy axioms 0,1,2, and
betweenness if and only if there exists a function U : L×X → R such that µ(p) uniquely
solves  
xi∈X
p(xi)U (xi,µ(p)) = 0 (A2)
with U(x,m) continuous, increasing in x, decreasing in m and satisﬁes U(x,m)=0i fx = m
(and with the normalization that µ(x0)=0a n dµ(x0) = 1). Converting (A2) to (A1) is






p(xi)(U(xi,m)+u(xi) − u(m)) = u(m)
Let F(x,m)=U(x,m)+u(x) − u(m). Note F(x,m) is continuous and increasing in x,
decreasing in m,a n dF(x,m)=0i fx = m. Since the function is continuous, we can now

















Lk(x,z) k =2 ,...,K
Let z =∆ k(m) and note L(x,∆k(m)) = 0 at x =∆ k(m). Finally, rescale the function by
βk.
31Table 1: Mehra-Prescott Calibration Results
Matching Mehra-Prescott/Melino-Yang State Prices
Melino Risk-Preference Model
Parameter Yang EU KP DA DAL GDA GDAL
α -12.65 -10.95 -2.10 1.00 -1.95 1.00
γ 1/α -1.26 -1.51 -1.15 -1.52 -1.20
β 0∗ 0∗ 1.15 1.75 1.25 1.70
δn a ∗ na∗ 1∗ 1∗ 0.98 0.995
MLL 1.8620 1.5664 1.5812 1.5542 1.5241 1.5462 1.4992
MLH 0.2440 0.5284 0.4899 0.5372 0.5665 0.5265 0.5788
MHL 1.1270 1.3733 1.3889 1.3829 1.3502 1.3708 1.3455
MHH 0.9490 0.4654 0.4323 0.4796 0.5231 0.4680 0.5222
E(R) 1.070 1.040 1.055 1.036 1.032 1.047 1.035
std(R) 0.165 0.037 0.044 0.044 0.042 0.043 0.042
E(r) 1.008 1.022 1.033 1.016 1.014 1.027 1.017
std(r) 0.056 0.004 0.010 0.010 0.008 0.009 0.009
The Melino-Yang pricing kernel is from equation (2). Six diﬀerent
models are presented: EU is time-additive expected utility, KP is
Kreps-Porteus recursive non-time-additive expected utility for atem-
poral gambles, DA is Recursive Disappointment Aversion utility, DAL
is Recursive Disappointment Aversion utility with risk-aversion param-
eter α =1( u(x) linear), GDA is Recursive Generalized Disappointment
Aversion, and GDAL is Recursive Generalized Disappointment Aver-
sion with risk-aversion parameter α =1( u(x) linear). α is the risk-
aversion in u(x); 1
1−γ is the intertemporal elasticity; β is the coeﬃcient
of loss-aversion (see equation (3)); δ is the threshold for disappoint-
ment (see equation (3)) For all models, the rate of time-preference is
constrained to be ρ =0 .01.
∗ β = 0 implies expected utility and δ is undeﬁned;
∗∗ δ =1 .0 implies Disappointment Aversion
32Table 2: Alternative Calibration
Conditional Heteroskedasticity State Prices
Risk-Preference Model
Parameter p =0 .4 KP DAL GDAL
α -12.02 1.00 1.00
γ -2.10 -1.09 1.00
β 0∗ 1.93 1.61
δn a ∗ 1∗ 0.93
MLL 2.4812 2.0733 1.9345 2.4812
MLH 0.3013 0.4499 0.5454 0.3013
MHL 0.9914 1.0534 1.6469 0.9914
MHH 0.9890 0.3755 0.4655 0.9890
E(R) 1.090 1.053 1.029 1.090
std(R) 0.165 0.049 0.042 0.165
E(r) 1.010 1.020 1.004 1.010
std(r) 0.000 0.015 0.010 0.000
The pricing kernel for the p =0 .4 calibration is shown in (25) and (24).
Three diﬀerent models are presented: KP is Kreps-Porteus recursive
non-time-additive expected utility for atemporal gambles, DAL is Re-
cursive Disappointment Aversion utility with risk-aversion parameter
α =1( u(x) linear), and GDAL is Recursive Generalized Disappoint-
ment Aversion with risk-aversion parameter α =1( u(x) linear). α
is the risk-aversion in u(x); 1
1−γ is the intertemporal elasticity; β is
the coeﬃcient of loss-aversion (see equation (3)); δ is the threshold
for disappointment (see equation (3)) For all models, the rate of time-
preference is constrained to be ρ =0 .01.
∗ β = 0 implies expected utility and δ is undeﬁned;
∗∗ δ =1 .0 implies Disappointment Aversion
33Figure 1: Indiﬀerence Simplex - Expected Utility





























Probability simplex over payoﬀs x1 =1 ,x2 =2 ,a n dx3 = 3 with
value function u(x)=l n ( x).
Figure 2: Indiﬀerence State-Space- Expected Utility



































Indifference Curve − G.D.A with α =0.00 δ =1.00 and β =0.00
Two states have equal probabilities, p(x1)=p(x2)=1
2 with value
function u(x)=l n ( x).
34Figure 3: Indiﬀerence Simplex - Gul Disappointment Aversion































Figure 4: Indiﬀerence Curve: Gul Disappointment Aversion



































Indifference Curve − G.D.A with α =0.00 δ =1.00 and β =2.00
Description Here
35Figure 5: Indiﬀerence Simplex - GDA































Figure 6: Indiﬀerence Curve: Generalized Disappointment Aversion



































Indifference Curve − G.D.A with α =0.00 δ =0.80 and β =2.00
Description Here















Two-period asset pricing economy. The lower left quadrant shows
the trade-oﬀ over risky consumption growth rates. The upper right
quadrant shows the intertemporal trade-oﬀ between certain con-
sumption plans. The upper-left quadrant shows the connection
between the certainty equivalence of the risky consumption growth
to the intertemporal consumption.



















Two-period asset pricing economy. The lower left quadrant shows
the trade-oﬀ over risky consumption growth rates. The upper right
quadrant shows the intertemporal trade-oﬀ between certain con-
sumption plans. The upper-left quadrant shows the connection
between the certainty equivalence of the risky consumption growth
to the intertemporal consumption.
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